Security Assessment Report

Table of Contents

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1. Executive Summary

This report details the findings of a "black box" penetration test conducted on ExampleCompany. The objective of this test was to identify vulnerabilities that could be exploited by an external, unauthenticated attacker with no prior knowledge of the target's internal infrastructure.

The test was performed from 2025-05-14 to 2025-05-28.

Key findings summary:

  • Overall Risk: critical.
  • Immediate remediation actions are highly recommended.

2. Introduction

2.1. Engagement Scope

The scope of this black box penetration test was limited to the following:

  • Target IP Addresses/Domains:
    • example.com
    • 192.168.1.112/28
    • api.example.com
    • api-dev.example.com
    • app.example.com
    • app-dev.example.com
    • cdn.example.com
    • cdn-dev.example.com
  • Services / Applications:
    • Services running under ports 22, 80, 443, and 8080.
  • Exclusions:
    • Social engineering
    • Denial of Service
    • api.example.com/v1.0/api/broken-api

2.2. Methodology

The penetration test was conducted using a black box approach, meaning the testers had no prior knowledge of the internal workings, source code, or infrastructure of the target system. The methodology followed a generally accepted penetration testing framework:

  • Information Gathering: Performed passive and active reconnaissance such as DNS enumeration, port scanning, and web application crawling.
  • Vulnerability Identification: Utilized automated scanning tools combined with manual analysis to identify potential weaknesses.
  • Exploitation: Attempted to exploit identified vulnerabilities to confirm their existence and assess potential impact.
  • Reporting: Documented findings, risk levels, and recommendations.

3. Findings

This section details the vulnerabilities identified during the penetration test. Each finding includes a risk rating, description, evidence, and recommendations for remediation.

3.1. Critical

3.1.1. Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) - User Profile Access

  • Risk: Critical
  • Description: An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability was identified in the user profile section of the web application. By manipulating a parameter in the URL, an unauthenticated attacker could access and view the profile details of any user, including sensitive information such as email addresses, full names, and potentially more.
  • Evidence:
    • Request: GET /profile?id=2 HTTP/1.1
    • Response (showing user ID 2's profile):

      <html>
      <body>
      <h1>User Profile</h1>
      <p>Name: John Doe</p>
      <p>Email: john.doe@example.com</p>
      </body>
      </html>
      
    • Steps to Reproduce:
      1. Navigate to a public profile (if available) or create a new user account.
      2. Observe the URL parameter (e.g., 'id') associated with the user profile.
      3. Change the 'id' parameter to an arbitrary number.
      4. Observe the profile details of the corresponding user.
  • Recommendation: Implement robust authorization checks on all requests accessing sensitive resources. Ensure that user input for direct object references is properly validated against the authenticated user's permissions. Use UUIDs or other non-sequential identifiers instead of predictable integers.

3.1.2. Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) via File Upload

  • Risk: Critical
  • Description: A vulnerability allowing unauthenticated remote code execution was discovered through an insecure file upload mechanism. The application failed to properly validate uploaded file types and content. This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the server, which can lead to a complete takeover of the server and adjacent assets.
  • Evidence:
    • Uploaded File: shell.php (containing <?php system($_GET['cmd']); ?>)
    • Request to execute: GET /uploads/shell.php?cmd=id HTTP/1.1
    • Response (showing output of 'id' command):

      uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
      
    • Steps to Reproduce:
      1. Access the public file upload form.
      2. Change the file extension to a server-side script extension (e.g., .php, .asp, .jsp) and embed malicious code.
      3. Upload the modified file.
      4. Access the uploaded file via a direct URL to execute the code.
  • Recommendation: Implement strict validation for file uploads, including:
    • Whitelisting allowed file types.
    • Verifying file magic numbers.
    • Renaming uploaded files to prevent execution (e.g., adding a non-executable extension, storing outside the web root).
    • Scanning uploaded files for malicious content.

3.2. High

3.2.1. SQL Injection in Login Form

  • Risk: High
  • Description: A SQL injection vulnerability was identified in the login form. The values of username and password fields are interpreted by the SQL server without validation. An attacker could bypass authentication and gain unauthorized access to the application. We could not retrieve the results of the executed query, but it is possible that an attacker could use this to exfiltrate data from the database.
  • Evidence:
    • Username: ' OR 1=1--
    • Password: any-password
    • Outcome: Successful login as the first user in the database (typically admin).
  • Recommendation: Utilize parameterized queries (prepared statements) for all database interactions. Implement input validation and encoding for all user-supplied data.

3.3. Medium

3.3.1. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected

  • Risk: Medium
  • Description: A reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability was found in the search API. Malicious scripts embedded in the search query parameter were reflected directly back to the user's browser. This allows an attacker to steal cookies, hijack sessions, or deface the page.
  • Evidence:
    • URL: http://example.com/search?query=<script>alert('XSS')</script>
    • Outcome: An alert box with "XSS" appears in the client browser.
  • Recommendation: Implement proper output encoding for all user-supplied data displayed on web pages. Sanitize user input to remove potentially malicious characters.

3.4. Low

3.4.1. Potentially insecure token used for authentication

  • Risk: Low
  • Description: The value of the token used in the Authentication HTTP header has low entropy. The header of the token (the first part before the dot .) is the user id, which is unusual. Additionally, the body of the token only contains 10 bytes, which is too low based on any security standard.
  • Evidence:
    • HTTP Request Header: Authentication: Bearer MTIzNA.MTIzNDU2Nzg5MA
  • Recommendation: Configure the application authentication middleware to use high-entropy JWTs (JSON Web Tokens). Follow standard encryption practices. For example, always verify the signature of the JWT and use high-entropy signing keys in the User service.

3.5. Info

3.5.1. Information Disclosure - Server Version

  • Risk: Info
  • Description: The web server is disclosing its version number in HTTP response headers (e.g., Server: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)). This information can be used by attackers to identify known vulnerabilities associated with specific software versions.
  • Evidence:
    • HTTP Response Header: Server: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
  • Recommendation: Configure the web server to suppress or obfuscate detailed version information in HTTP response headers.

4. Overall Risk Assessment

The penetration test revealed critical and high-risk vulnerabilities that could lead to data breaches and unauthorized system access. The most pressing concerns are the unauthenticated RCE and the IDOR vulnerabilities, which potentially allow for complete compromise of user data and underlying servers.

5. Remediation Plan

It is recommended that all identified vulnerabilities be addressed as soon as possible. Prioritize critical and high severity findings. Follow ExampleCompany's official risk management policy.

5.1. Immediate Actions

  • Implement strong input validation and output encoding: For all user-supplied data, particularly for web forms, file uploads, and URL parameters.
  • Use high-entropy identifiers: For all identifiers, avoid using sequential numbers. Use high-entropy values such as an UUID.
  • Enforce robust authorization checks: Ensure all direct object references are authorized against the authenticated user's permissions.
  • Utilize parameterized queries: For ALL database interactions with a parameter, to prevent SQL injection.
  • Review and harden file upload mechanisms: Implement strict whitelisting, magic number checks, and non-executable storage locations. If possible, store uploaded files in a separate component of the system, such as a cloud storage bucket.

5.2. General Enhancements

  • Implement security-in-depth techniques: Avoid single points of failure in all parts of the system. Features like a WAF can be beneficial to slow down current attackers or discourage real-world hackers from targeting it.
  • Security Training: Provide regular security awareness training for developers and administrators. As part of the incident management policy, conduct lessons learned meetings.
  • Secure Defaults: Ensure all software, frameworks, and operating systems, especially those which are internet facing, are kept up to date with the latest security patches and use a secure configuration as recommended by the vendor.
  • Segmentation: If possible, segment monolithic services into low-privilege components.
  • Principle of Least Privilege: Apply the principle of least privilege.
  • Reduce internet footprint: A smaller internet footprint is easier to manage, easier to protect and discourage hackers from targeting your system.

6. Disclaimers

This report reflects the findings at the time of the penetration test. New vulnerabilities may emerge, and existing vulnerabilities may be exploited in unforeseen ways. The information contained herein is for the sole use of ExampleCompany and should not be distributed without prior written consent from Panke.

This document is provided solely as an example penetration test report for illustrative and informational purposes. It does not represent a real assessment of any specific system, network, or application, nor does it guarantee the security posture of any entity. The findings, recommendations, and all other content within this report are fictional and are not intended to be relied upon for any actual security decisions or actions.

7. Appendices

7.1. Tools Used (not an exhaustive list)

  • Nmap
  • ffuf
  • PHP
  • Docker
  • Nikto
  • Node.js
  • OpenSSL
  • Linux command line utilities:
    • curl
    • dig
    • nc
    • base64
    • sha256sum
    • jq
  • OWASP ZAP
  • Metasploit Framework
  • theHarvester
  • GNU Emacs

7.2. Contact Information

Author: Alexander Holmquist (contact@pankeit.com)

Date: 2025-06-01

Emacs 29.3 (Org mode 9.6.15)

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